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The future consequences of climate change are highly uncertain. Today, the exact size of 
possible future damages are widely unknown. Governments try to cope with these risks by 
investing in mitigation and adaptation measures. Mitigation aims at a reduction of greenhouse 
gas emissions whereas adaptation reduces the follow-up costs of climate change. In contrast 
to the existing literature, we explicitly model the decision of risk-averse governments on 
mitigation and adaptation policies. Furthermore we also consider the interaction of the two 
strategies. Mitigation efforts of a single country trigger crowding out as other countries will 
reduce their mitigation efforts. We show that, under fairly mild conditions, a unilateral 
increase in mitigation efforts of a single country can even increase global emissions. In 
contrast, a unilateral commitment to large adaptation efforts benefits the single country and 
may reduce the global risk from climate change at the expense of other countries. 
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Climate change is one of the major global policy issues and has been on the policy
agenda for more than two decades. The consensus view nowadays predicts an average
increase in global temperature of at least 4 degrees centigrade and up to 6 degrees
centigrade until the end of this century, if no measures are taken to reduce greenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions [IPCC (2007)]. Many prominent studies on the welfare eects
of climate change come up with signicant cost estimates for the global economy.1
The majority of researchers also agree that there is considerable uncertainty about
the magnitude of damages. This uncertainty rapidly increases when the temperature
hike exceeds the 3-degree-centigrade threshold. For this scenario, current estimates
of the welfare eects range from slight gains to losses of more than 10 percent of
world GDP [Tol (2010), Aldy etal. (2010)]. Even though the large uncertainty is
frequently mentioned, e.g. by Aldy etal. (2010), the endogeneity of the distribution
of climate risk is hardly ever taken into account when analyzing the eects of climate
policy. Climate policy aects both the size and dispersion of future damages from
climate change. The present paper reveals that the risk dimension of climate policy
has major implications for the role of commitment on unilateral advances and thus
for the non-cooperative climate policy game.
To cope with the potential welfare costs of climate change, two types of measures
are available: mitigation and adaptation. Mitigation aims at a reduction of global
GHG emissions, whereas adaptation limits damages induced by climate change. An
important dierence between the two strategies is that mitigation eorts are contri-
butions to a global public good (no one can be excluded from potential benets)
and adaptation is a private or local public good with spatially limited eects.
For years now, governments and politicians have tried to implement a global cli-
mate treaty to limit GHG emission without much success so far. To address this
problem, unilateral advances in mitigation are frequently advocated by the media,
environmentalists and the public. The main argument claims that advances in mi-
tigation eorts will force other countries to imitate the unselsh behavior and thus
lead to a more favorable scenario of climate change. Economists, in contrast, have
frequently argued that unilateral measures of mitigation policy may simply crowd
out mitigation eorts by other players and would therefore not be very successful. In
absence of a global agreement or a (benevolent) world government, climate policy is
made by individual countries in a non-cooperative setting. Besides individual incen-
tives, the reactions of all other players have to be taken into account and countries
strategically set their climate policy [BMF (2010)].
1 For recent surveys, see Tol (2009), Tol (2010) and Aldy etal. (2010).
2This type of analysis is often carried out within the framework of a public goods
game with private provision. The nature and the comparative static properties
of this game have been analyzed by Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986).
Hoel (1991) applied this framework in the context of international climate policy.
His seminal analysis of unilateral action in global environmental problems shows
that a commitment on unilateral advances changes the equilibrium outcome: the
unilateral advances are partially crowded out due to the reduced equilibrium eorts
of the other contributors.2 Other forms of strategic behavior have also been studied.
For instance, countries may prefer to remain uninformed about their country-specic
benets from a public good [Morath (2010)]. This underinvestment helps them
to commit to a low level of public good contribution while all other countries are
worse o. The role of endogenous uncertainty and information has also received
some attention. Robledo (1999) considers whether risk averse players may abstain
from purchasing insurance, because the exposure to the risk provides a strategic
benet in a future game of voluntary contributions to a public good.3Kane and
Shogren (2000) consider climate policy as a choice of risk-taking, without conside-
ration of the strategic eects for the equilibrium interaction in the non-cooperative
equilibrium.4
We reconsider the initial crowding-out argument and take into consideration how
environmental risk and risk aversion of governments aect its relevance. Advocates
of a more pronounced mitigation policy with precommitment often claim that the
economists' argument fails to fully take into account the risks of climate change. In
fact if it is not only the total (expected) payo that matters but also its riskiness,
the individual contribution to the global public good and also the crowding out may
be quite dierent. This argument is given a closer scrutiny here, assuming that the
representative citizens are risk-averse and represented by a benevolent government
in each country. National governments decide on the individual amount of miti-
2 In an experimental setting, Sturm and Weimann (2004) conrm Hoel's result, when countries
decide simultaneously on the public good contribution. Numerous other extensions have been
developed, e.g. Vicary (2009) modies the model for explaining what drives non-cooperative
mitigation policy with respect to asymmetries between countries.
3 There is a broad literature on further strategic aspects in the private provision of public goods.
These include Konrad (1994), Ihori (1996), Buchholz, Nett and Peters (1998) and Si-
queira (2003).
4 Of course, the risk dimension plays a crucial role in many contributions to climate change. Howe-
ver, the uncertainty is rarely included in the objective function of the decision maker. Ingham,
Ma and Ulph (2007) regard uncertainty as a lack of knowledge and examine the eects of future
learning on climate policy. Tol and Yohe (2007) focuses on expected cost-benet analysis and
its applicability when damages are highly uncertain using the integrated assessment model FUND
(Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation and Distribution). Hasson, L ofgren and
Visser (2010) include uncertainty about climate change in an experimental setting by adding
a stochastic risk component to test whether participants contribute more in high-vulnerability
treatments.
3gation eorts and thus inuence the global public good 'GHG emission reduction'.
The magnitude of climate change then aects the size and riskiness of damages in
a country. Thus, mitigation policy acts as a self-insurance device [Ehrlich and
Becker (1972)].
The contributions to the public goods literature that are structurally closest to ours
are Ihori and McGuire (2007), Ihori and McGuire (2010), and, in particular,
Lohse, Robledo and Schmidt (2010). These contributions consider voluntary
contributions to a group public good, with the public good being self insurance (the
sum of contributions reducing the size of the loss) and/or being self protection (the
sum of contributions reducing the probability of a loss). Ihori and McGuire (2007)
analyze the importance of group size in this framework. Lohse, Robledo and
Schmidt (2010) characterize the welfare optimum, consider existence and properties
of the non-cooperative equilibrium, and the interaction with market insurance in
an expected utility framework. These analyses show the importance of income
eects of contributions by others and how they interact with decreasing or increasing
absolute risk aversion in a player's contribution decision. Thereby they uncover an
important mechanism that is also driving the results in our framework. We use a
mean-variance approach, such that the dierence between self-insurance and self-
protection becomes less pronounced, and ask the policy question about the strategic
implications of a unilateral commitment on advances.
Our analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we derive the optimal amount of mi-
tigation from the point of view of a single risk-averse country given the mitigation
eorts of all other countries. We show how the contribution to the global public
good varies with the wealth of a country and its exposure to climate change. And {
most importantly { we show that risk considerations cause an even more pronoun-
ced crowding-out eect. Under fairly mild conditions, the unilateral advance of a
single country in mitigation policy induces policy changes in the rest of the world
such that total mitigation eorts are reduced. Intuitively, the additional mitigation
eort works much like an income transfer to the rest of the world. The increase in
income makes the other countries more willing to bear risks. Hence, they reduce
their own mitigation eorts. In the end, the unilateral advance can lead to more glo-
bal risks in the aggregate. Second, we derive the Nash equilibrium and characterize
its properties if all countries contribute to the global public good. The equilibrium
analysis conrms that unilateral advances away from the Nash equilibrium can be
strongly counterproductive. Third, we consider adaptation as an alternative cli-
mate policy strategy. Adaptation limits the local damages from climate change and
is therefore, by assumption, a substitute measure for self-insurance. The focus on
adaptation in climate policy is benecial for a single country not only because it
reduces the risk from climate change, but also because it aects the behavior of
other countries. The early commitment to signicantly large adaptation eorts acts
4as a credible promise that this country will exert low mitigation eorts in the future.
This, in turn, forces the other countries to pursue more ambitious mitigation goals.
The paper is structured as follows: section 2 discusses the contributions to global
mitigation in a model with risk-taking behavior. In section 3, we extend the model
by also allowing for adaptation as a second strategy of climate policy. Section 4
concludes.
2 Mitigation Policy Only
2.1 A Country's Individually Optimal Choice
For the moment, we will focus on the climate policy of a single country or region and
denote this region with index 1, whereas the rest of the world is labeled "country 2".
In a strategic context, we treat country 2 as one single player for simplicity reasons.5
Global CO2 emissions determine the well-being in the world as they are causal for
climate change.6 Country 1 faces the risk of a stochastic net damage (loss) L1 from
climate change with mean  1 and standard deviation  1. This stochastic damage
can be inuenced by investing in mitigation policies. If country 1 invests m1 and the
rest of the world invests m2 in mitigation, the eective damage becomes (m)  L1
with m = m1 + m2. Hence, mitigation is a global public good, since the quality of
the public good depends on the contributions of all countries.
Some regularity assumptions about  are as follows: we assume that the function
 is twice continuously dierentiable, decreasing in additional mitigation, but at a
decreasing rate [
@(m)
@m  m  0] and [
@2(m)
(@m)2  mm  0]. The rst dollar spent on
climate policy is highly productive [
@(m)m=0
@m =  1] and beyond a certain threshold
 m, additional measures do not further reduce damages from climate change [
@(m)
@m =
0] for all m   m. Mitigation comes at a cost. We assume a twice continuously
dierentiable and convex cost function c(m1) with cm  0, cmm > 0 and c(0) =
cm(0) = 0. Let y1 be the initial wealth of country 1. The country can inuence
the size and riskiness of the stochastic nal wealth V1 by choosing the appropriate
mitigation measures:
V1 = y1   c(m1)   (m)  L1: (1)
Country 1 is populated by a representative risk-averse individual that has preferences
5 This simplies the analysis considerably and allows us to study the strategic context. Evidently
it disregards the fact that some countries in the rest of the world may be in a corner solution,
and also the strategic interaction between them.
6 Throughout the paper, we use CO2 as an example of greenhouse gases.
5over the mean and the standard deviation of domestic wealth, represented by a twice
continuously dierentiable utility function U(1;1), where 1 denotes the mean
and 1 the standard deviation of nal wealth. The utility function has the usual
properties U > 0, U < 0, U < 0 and U < 0.7
We can now analyze the climate policy of a single country that maximizes the utility
of a representative citizen. For the moment, we take m2, the mitigation eorts in the





with 1 = y1   c(m1)   (m1 + m2)   1
1 = (m1 + m2)   1
(2)
Mitigation reduces the riskiness [1] of damages induced by climate change, but
has an ambiguous eect on the expected wealth [1]. While the expected damage
is reduced, mitigation is also associated with costs. Domestic climate policy has
to balance these countervailing eects by choosing an appropriate contribution to
global mitigation eorts.
The rst-order condition is
FOC: f
m  Um1 + Um1 = 0 (3)
where m1 and m1 are the derivatives of mean and standard deviation with respect
to m1. The second-order condition is given by fm
m 
@fm
@m < 0. Rearranging the
rst-order condition yields the rst results of our analysis:
d1
d1









The left-hand side of equation (4) describes the marginal rate of substitution bet-
ween expected wealth and risk. It tells us how much additional expected wealth is
needed to compensate the representative individual for a slight increase in the stan-
dard deviation. The right-hand side captures the marginal rate of transformation.
Country 1 has to give up some expected wealth through mitigation to reduce the risk
of damages from climate change. In the optimum, the marginal rate of substitution
and the marginal rate of transformation are equalized.
7 As all distributions in the choice set belong to the same linear class, the mean-variance-approach
is equivalent to the expected utility approach; see Meyer (1987) and Sinn (1989). The latter
also contains a comprehensive treatment of the mean-variance-approach.
6Figure 1: Optimal climate policy for country 1
The outcome is illustrated in Figure 1. The ()-curve describes the eciency
frontier of the opportunity set in country 1 for a given mitigation policy m2 in the
rest of the world. All points beneath the curve are also feasible but inecient; all
points above are not attainable. The slope of this curve equals the marginal rate of




 cm(m1)   m   1
m   1
: (5)
Without any investments (m1 = 0), the economy is situated at point A. The rst
dollar invested in mitigation is highly productive, whereas the marginal cost is zero.
The slope of the eciency frontier in A amounts to  
 1
 1. Starting to invest in
mitigation, the mean wealth increases and the standard deviation is reduced. When
the productivity of further investments becomes suciently small (beyond point B),
the reduced risk comes at the cost of a lower expected wealth. As the slope of the
indierence curve  U corresponds to the marginal rate of substitution, the optimal
climate policy for country 1 is reached when the indierence curve becomes tangent
to the opportunity set (point C). Note that the position of the eciency frontier
changes when m2 varies. How changes in m2 eect the opportunity set of country 1
is discussed in the next section.
How does the domestic policy react to changes in the exposure to risk? Will coun-
tries with larger expected damages and larger risk also spend more on mitigation
measures? We carry out a comparative static analysis of mitigation eorts with
respect to   and  . To obtain the reaction in domestic mitigation measures to in-














f[U  U   U  U] 
1





Note that U is positive; @
@m and fm
m are both negative. Hence, the overall sign of
equation (7) depends on the term in square brackets, which describes the absolute
risk aversion of the representative individual (see Appendix A.1). The individual
has a decreasing (increasing) absolute risk aversion if the term in square brackets
is positive (negative). Therefore, a country reacts to increasing expected climate
damages with an increase in mitigation measures as long as absolute risk aversion
does not increase too strongly.
In a next step, we analyze the impact of a larger risk  1 on mitigation eorts.
















describing the slope of the indierence curve. The slope S is
positive and will increase in 1 if the absolute risk aversion is not increasing too
strongly. Hence, for the plausible cases of constant or decreasing absolute risk
aversion, mitigation eorts increase with rising risks from climate change.
Proposition 1. For constant and decreasing absolute risk aversion, the mitigation
eorts of a country will rise with (i) its expected damage [ 1] and (ii) its risk exposure
[ 1].
Finally, we can also carry out the comparative statics with respect to a country's
initial wealth. The question is whether mitigation policies of richer countries dier











Again, the eect depends on the term in square brackets. Assuming decreasing
absolute risk aversion, the term will be positive and mitigation measures decrease
in y1. If a country gets richer, its willingness to invest in mitigation will go down.
8Proposition 2. With decreasing absolute risk aversion, the mitigation eorts de-
pend negatively on a country's initial wealth.
In the standard models of private provision of public goods, the contribution to
a public good rises with income (if the public good is normal). In our case, the
rise in income makes the representative individual marginally less risk averse and in
consequence leads to a lower contribution.
2.2 Unilateral Advances in Mitigation Policy
Unilateral advances in climate policies are frequently advocated by the media, envi-
ronmental activists and the public. Politics is pressured to go ahead with mitigation
policies. The main argument is that advances in climate policies will induce other
countries to imitate this behavior and thus lead to a more favorable scenario of cli-
mate change. In this section, we analyze the consequences of unilateral advances in
mitigation policy for global mitigation eorts and for global risk-taking. How does
country 1 adjust its mitigation policy if country 2 exogenously increases expendi-
tures on mitigation? Again, using the rst-order condition (3), we can evaluate










The relevant question here is whether country 1 will fully or partially crowd out the
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(see Appendix A.2). As fm
m < 0 shows up in the numerator and denominator, the
overall eect depends on the second and third term in the numerator denoted by
A and B. If both terms sum up to zero, we have perfect crowding out (
@m1
@m2 =
 1). If A + B becomes negative, the reduction in mitigation eort of country 1
even overcompensates the additional eorts of the other country (
@m1
@m2 <  1); total
mitigation eorts are reduced.
Taking a closer look, the sign of term A depends on the degree of absolute risk
aversion captured by the term in square brackets.8 Again, for constant absolute
8 Note that m < 0, U > 0 and cm  0.
9risk aversion it becomes zero and for decreasing absolute risk aversion it becomes
positive (see Appendix A.1). Term B, nally, is always positive due to the convexity
of the cost function.
Proposition 3. With constant or increasing absolute risk aversion, a unilateral
increase in the mitigation eort of other countries is only partly crowded out by the
reduced eorts of country 1. If, however, the absolute risk aversion is suciently
decreasing, the increased mitigation eorts of other countries are more than crowded
out.
Under the plausible condition of decreasing absolute risk aversion, unilateral in-
creases in mitigation eorts by a single country may be counterproductive. In
contrast to the standard models of public contributions, a unilateral increase in
investment can be more than crowded out so that global mitigation even decreases.
The explanation for this seemingly paradoxical result is the wealth eect created by
the unilateral mitigation eorts.
The dierent eects are illustrated in Figure 2. The unilateral eorts of the other
country shift up the opportunity set of country 1. For each risk 1, country 1 now
achieves a higher expected wealth as the costs of mitigation are now borne to a
larger extent by the other country. In addition to the shift upward, the slope of
the eciency frontier changes. This can be seen from equation (5). For each level
of 1, the slope of the eciency curve is lower, since the marginal cost to achieve
1 has fallen. Whether country 1 wants to select a lower or higher risk depends
furthermore on the risk preferences. For constant absolute risk aversion, the slope
of the indierence curve  U remains constant for a given level of 1 (e.g., when
moving from C to C'). If relative risk aversion is strongly decreasing, the attening
of the indierence curve will be stronger than the attening of the eciency frontier.
Then a tangency point to the right of C' is chosen. In this case, country 1's expected
wealth increases but the risk has become larger too. In the next section, we study
whether this seemingly paradoxical result can also survive in the Nash equilibrium.
2.3 The Non-Cooperative Equilibrium in Mitigation
So far, we have focused on the decisions of a single country and its reactions to a
change in country 2. We now turn to the equilibrium in which both countries' choices
are determined endogenously. In the absence of a (benevolent) world government
and of binding global climate agreements, these contributions are made in a non-
cooperative setting. Each region decides on its privately optimal mitigation level
{ given the mitigation eorts of the other country. The Nash equilibrium of the
10Figure 2: Country 1's response to unilateral mitigation eorts
mitigation game is then a vector of contributions (m
1;m
2) where each m
i is the
best response to m
j fullling equation (3) [i;j = 1;2;i 6= j].
Proposition 4. The Nash equilibrium of mitigation eorts has the following proper-
ties: (a) There is at least one stable interior equilibrium in pure strategies. (b) The
excessive crowding out [
@mi
@mj <  1 with i;j = 1;2] can only occur in an asymmetric
equilibrium.
Proof. (a) Consider the reaction functions m1(m2) and m2(m1). Each intersection
of these reaction functions is a Nash equilibrium, denoted (m
1;m
2). The reaction
functions are continuous self-mappings on the closed and compact set [0;  m]. Hence,
these functions intersect at least once. This proves that a Nash equilibrium exists.
We can rule out m
i   m for i 2 f1;2g by the following reasoning: i's utility is higher
for mi =  m than for mi >  m. Moreover, a marginal reduction in eort at mi =  m
increases i's utility since this reduction has a positive rst-order eect on i, but a
zero rst-order eect on i. This result, in turn, can be used to rule out m
i = 0.
Consider a marginal increase in mi at mi = 0. As m
j <  m, this increase has a strictly
benecial rst-order eect on i and a non-negative rst-order eect on i. This
shows that at least one interior equilibrium exists. Further, by the same arguments,
0 < mi(mj) <  m for all mj 2 [0;  m], and limmj!  m mi(mj) = 0. Accordingly, the
curve m1(m2) starts above m2(0) in gure 3, and must, at some point, fall below




@m1 < 1 must be
fullled. (b) The statement is a corollary of (a): If both countries are symmetric,
then the reaction functions are mirror images. The number of equilibria must be
11Figure 3: The Nash equilibrium in mitigation eorts with asymmetric countries
uneven. Hence, the symmetric equilibrium must be one in which m1(m2) intersects
m2(m1) from the upper left to the lower right. As a consequence of symmetry, we
observe less than full crowding out as j
dmi
dmjj < 1. However, as shown in gure 3, more
than full crowding out may occur in the case of asymmetric countries. To the left
of the Nash equilibrium, both reaction curves are located beneath the dashed line
(m= const.), which denotes all mitigation eorts m1 and m2 generating the same
total mitigation level as in the Nash equilibrium (m
1;m
2). If country 2 unilaterally





holds but global mitigation decreases when unilateral advances are made.
Without further specifying the functional forms, it is impossible to say whether the
equilibrium is unique. However, if there are 2n+1 equilibria, at least n+1 of them
must be stable.
Proposition 4 shows that the seemingly paradoxical eect of more than crowding
out can survive in the neighborhood of a Nash equilibrium. It requires that one
country reacts very exibly to changes in mitigation, whereas the other country has
to react little. Within the context of actual climate policy, this need not be a strong
assumption. In the standard Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) framework
of private provision of a public good, only partial crowding out (or full crowding
out as a limiting case) is possible. Hence, in this framework generous unilateral self-
commitment to reduce emissions by more than the equilibrium amount may be costly
for the country that makes this commitment, but overall it has a (possibly small
12but) positive eect for the environment overall. The result of excessive crowding
out that can emerge in the context of uncertain environmental damages shows that
the overall eect for climate policy can even be negative. Hence, uncertainty and
risk aversion strengthen the policy arguments against generous commitments for
unilateral emission reductions.
3 Adaptation as an Additional Instrument in Cli-
mate Policy
As we have just seen, unilateral advances in mitigation may not work in a non-
cooperative setting. In the extreme case, the additional eorts of a single country
are more than crowded out by the other country. If unilateral advances in mitigation
do not work, maybe an alternative strategy using adaptation can help to improve
global risk-taking. Adaptation comprises all measures that reduce the damages from
climate change (e.g, higher dams or more stable buildings as a protection against
extreme weather events).9 In a rst step, we extend our model by allowing for
adaptation as an additional instrument for domestic climate policy. For the purpose
of clarity, we start out again with the partial equilibrium approach and focus solely
on a single country, which uses adaptation in a non-strategic manner. In a second
step, we allow one country to use adaptation as a strategic instrument. We analyze
how the Nash equilibrium is aected when one country can commit to an adaptation
policy before the mitigation game is played.
3.1 The Optimal Mix of Adaptation and Mitigation
We extend our base model to allow for adaptation eorts in addition to mitigation.
If country 1 invests m1 in mitigation and a1 in adaptation, the eective damage
from climate change becomes (a1;m)  L1 with m = m1 + m2. While mitigation
is a global public good, adaptation is a private good. We assume that adaptation
has the same qualitative impact on  as mitigation, i.e. a  0 and aa > 0 and
can thus be seen as a perfect substitute to mitigation. The cost of adaptation is
denoted by k(a1) with ka  0, kaa > 0 and k(0) = ka(0) = 0. Country 1 now faces
9 For a more detailed distinction between dierent types of adaptation, see for example Fankhau-
ser, Smith and Tol (1999). An alternative classication of adaptation measures is given by
Ingham, Ma and Ulph (2007).
13a stochastic nal wealth of
V1 = y1   k(a1)   c(m1)   (a1;m)  L1
with 1 = y1   k(a1)   c(m1)   (a1;m)   1
and 1 = (a1;m)   1
Maximizing utility U(1;1) of the representative individual with respect to m1 and
a1 yields
f
a  Ua1 + Ua1 = 0 (12)
f
m  Um1 + Um1 = 0 (13)
















Hence, the marginal rate of substitution has to be equal to the marginal rate of
transformation of both adaptation and mitigation.10 Substituting the derivatives of




m   1
=  
ka
a1   1
: (15)
Country 1 should choose adaptation and mitigation in a way such that the marginal
cost per unit of risk reduction is the same across the two policy instruments.
Proposition 5. From the point of view of a single country, climate policy will be
chosen optimally if (i) the marginal rate of substitution between  and  equals
its marginal rate of transformation and if (ii) the marginal cost of adaptation and
mitigation per unit of risk reduction are equalized.
Adaptation creates only local benets but it is nevertheless linked to the global
mitigation eorts. As mitigation and adaptation are substitutes with respect to risk
reduction, a country will also adjust its adaptation policy in the wake of additional
mitigation eorts of the rest of the world. We discuss this strategic interaction
between mitigation and adaptation in the next section.
10The second-order conditions are in Appendix A.3.
143.2 Adaptation as a Commitment Device
Suppose that country 1 can credibly commit to a certain amount of adaptation
measures. Later, both countries 1 and 2 play the contribution game with respect to
mitigation eorts.11 The early commitment will inuence the mitigation eorts of
the other country. In the following, we analyze whether country 1 has an incentive
to use such a commitment strategy. We also discuss under which conditions global
risks from climate change will be reduced.
We reformulate our model as a two-stage game. In stage 1, country 1 commits to
adaptation  a1. In stage 2, the mitigation game is played as described in section 2.
Solving by backward induction, we start in the second stage, where each country i
chooses its own contribution mi for a given contribution of the other country and for
a given level of adaptation of country 1 ( a1). The rst-order condition for country
1 is
Um1( a1;m1 + m2) + Um1( a1;m1 + m2) = 0: (16)
The interesting question is how country 1's contribution varies with the previous











m < 0, the reaction depends on the sign of fm
a , which tells us how the marginal
utility of mitigation measures changes when we increase adaptation eorts slightly.
Even though one might argue that adaptation and mitigation are no perfect substi-
tutes, it is quite plausible that there is some degree of substitutability, i.e., damages
that can be avoided by further mitigation could also be reduced by strengthening
adaptation eorts. In this case, we have fm
a < 0. An increase in adaptation in the
rst stage then decreases the mitigation eorts in the second stage.12
As m1 varies with adaptation eorts, the entire contribution game will be aected
by the commitment strategy. We analyze this eect by turning to stage 1 of the
game. We maximize the utility U((a1;m1 + m2);(a1;m1 + m2)) over a1, which
11The other country may simultaneously decide on adaptation measures. For simplicity, we take
the adaptation eorts of the other country as exogenously given.
12Alternatively, mitigation and adaptation could reinforce each other; then we have complements
[fm
a > 0]. Even though there is some debate about complementarity between mitigation and
adaptation, this distinction refers to the cross eects on marginal costs rather than on damages;




































Using the rst-order condition (16), the expression simplies to










The rst term in square brackets describes the marginal utility from additional
adaptation eorts neglecting the strategic eects [see equation (12)]. The second
term captures the commitment eect of early adaptation. It measures the impact on
marginal utility, when adaptation is slightly increased and the mitigation eorts of
the other country are adjusted. The rst three factors are negative.13 If adaptation
and mitigation are substitutes, the last factor is also negative. Hence, we get the
following result:
Proposition 6. If adaptation and mitigation are (imperfect) substitutes in limiting
the damages from climate change (fm
a < 0), a country can gain from an early
commitment to large adaptation eorts. The commitment strategy induces other
countries to increase their mitigation eorts.
The country strategically overinvests in adaptation. The high investments are a
credible strategy as they are largely irreversible. In contrast, a commitment to low
investments is rarely credible as there is always the opportunity of topping up. The
commitment to the adaptation strategy forces the other countries to foster their
mitigation eorts. Figure 4 illustrates the eect on the provision of mitigation. The
commitment to early adaptation shifts the reaction curve of country 1 inwards. The
Nash equilibrium moves from point A to point B. Country 2 has to increase its mi-
tigation eorts. The dashed line describes the mitigation eorts m1 and m2 yielding
the same global mitigation as in the Nash equilibrium A. In the case depicted, the
new Nash equilibrium B is below the dashed line. Hence, the selsh adaptation
strategy benets country 1 but leads to a lower global mitigation eort. However,
whenever
@m2
@m1 <  1 holds in equilibrium (i.e. mitigation eorts are more than crow-
ded out), the new equilibrium would be located above the dashed line. Here, the
13To be precise, the sign of @m2
@m1 depends on the absolute risk aversion and on the convexity of
the cost function; see section 2. We neglect the special cases, where extreme values of increasing
absolute risk aversion and/or convex costs could make the reaction curve upward-sloping.
16Figure 4: Adaptation as a commitment device
selsh adaptation strategy even helps to generate a lower level of global risks from
climate change. Clearly, the other country looses in terms of expected wealth as it
has to make larger contributions to the global public good.
4 Conclusion
The proposed model allows to consider explicitly the dimension of uncertainty in
climate policy. Uncertainty about the future damages from climate change forces
countries to invest in adaptation and mitigation measures as two alternative forms
of self-insurance. Our paper shows that the risk dimension even reinforces the
crowding-out problem of global mitigation eorts. Even though mitigation may
be an ecient measure from a global perspective, unilateral advances in mitigation
are ineective in the absence of a benevolent global government. Unilateral ad-
vances work like a wealth transfer to the rest of the world. Making the rest of the
world richer also marginally reduces the risk-aversion. The mitigation eorts of the
countries are reduced.
We have also shown that adaptation may be a promising strategy. The early invest-
ment in adaptation acts as a commitment to low mitigation eorts in the future and
thus forces the other countries to pursue a more ambitious mitigation policy.
Admittedly, this paper is only a rst step towards the explicit consideration of risk
17and dierent risk-taking behavior in models of climate change. There are still many
open questions that have to be answered in subsequent research. For instance, we
have completely ignored the time dimension. As learning about the damaging eects
of climate change will take place over time, countries may benet from following a
waiting strategy as seen in Ingham, Ma and Ulph (2007). Adaptation facilitates
such a waiting strategy as it still allows a country to still react to climate change
even when it is too late for eective mitigation policies.
18A Appendix
A.1 Absolute Risk Aversion
Let S be the slope of the indierence curve [S   U
U]. Absolute risk aversion is
decreasing (increasing) if the slope of the indierence curve decreases (increases)






























The derivatives of equation (3) amount to
f
m
m = U  ( cm1   m   )
2 + U  ( cm1   m   )  m   
+ U  ( cm1m1   mm   ) + U  ( cm1   m   )  m   
+ U  (m   )





= U  ( cm1   m   )  ( m   ) + U  ( cm1   m   )  m   
+ U  ( mm   ) + U  ( m   )  m   
+ U  (m   )
2 + U  mm   :
(A.23)





m +U ( cm1  m   )cm1 +U m    cm1 +U cm1m1: (A.24)
Substituting in (10) leads to equation (11).
A.3 Second-Order Condition
The second-order conditions are
f
a
a < 0 f
m







2 > 0: (A.25)








2 = [A + Uaa + Uaa][A + Umm + Umm]   [A + Uam + Uam]
2
= A[Umm + Umm] + A[Uaa + Uaa]
+[Uaa + Uaa][Umm + Umm]
 2A[Uam + Uam]   [Uam + Uam]
2





A  Uij + Uij + Uji + Uij (A.26)
and i;j = fa;mg. The second-order condition is always fullled if we have
(A1) A < 0
(A2) ii   ij > 0,
i.e. the cross-derivative U should not be too strongly positive and an increase in
climate measure i reduces the marginal productivity i more than an increase in
measure j. The latter implies some degree of complementarity between adaptation
and mitigation. In the case with perfect substitutability, we have ij = 0.
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